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Modified Universalism as Customary  
International Law* 
Irit Mevorach 
Introduction 
“Modified universalism” is to date the dominant approach for 
addressing cross-border insolvency.1 Heavily influenced by the scholarship 
and advocacy of Professor Jay Westbrook,2 it has evolved into a set of norms 
 
* This Article is adapted from IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: 
OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 80–126 (2018), with permission from Oxford University 
Press. 
 Professor of International Commercial Law, School of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Nottingham, U.K. I would like to thank Ian Fletcher, John Pottow, Janis Sarra, Adrian 
Walters, Dino Kritsiotis, Marko Milanovic, Sandesh Sivakumaran, and Tomer Broude for reading 
and providing invaluable comments on drafts of IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 80–126 (2018), which form the basis of 
this Article. 
1. “Cross-border insolvency” (or international insolvency) means here any form of process or 
solution, including liquidation, reorganization, or restructuring processes, concerning commercial 
entities or financial institutions that have cross-border presence (e.g., assets, creditors, branches, or 
subsidiaries). 
2. See generally Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. 
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that can guide parties in actual cases. Adapted to the reality of a world divided 
into different legal systems and myriad business structures and insolvency 
scenarios, modified universalism seeks to achieve global collective processes 
with efficient levels of centralization of insolvency proceedings. It thus 
requires the identification of a home country where proceedings would be 
centralized, except where it is efficient to open additional proceedings 
elsewhere.3 This outbound aspect of modified universalism is complemented 
by a choice-of-law norm that, in principle, refers to the lex fori concursus 
(the law of the forum) with limited exceptions.4 Norms concerning 
 
REV. 2276 (2000) (recognizing modified universalism as the best interim solution to addressing 
multinational insolvencies before movement to a “true universalism” approach). 
3. See, e.g., REINHARD BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW 23 (2017) 
(discussing the circumstances under which it may be reasonable to permit the commencement of 
additional proceedings); IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–17 
(2d ed. 2005); ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 786 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“But some leeway is also given to the concept of territoriality to accommodate the legitimate 
expectations of local creditors in relation to local assets. Thus the opening of territorial proceedings 
is permitted in a State where the debtor has an establishment or assets . . . .”); Jay L. Westbrook, 
SIFIs and States, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 332 (2014) (advocating for the assignment of one 
jurisdiction as the primer inter pares to most effectively coordinate international financial crises). 
4. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 31 (“Second, the proceedings follow the law of the opening 
state (lex fori concursus), which not only boosts efficiency but also constitutes an aspect of 
universalism.”) (citation omitted); Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care 
for Secured Creditors’ Rights in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 515 & n.7 
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recognition, cooperation, and relief ensure that the global collective 
proceedings are given worldwide effect,5 subject to specific safeguards where 
recognition or relief may be denied if universal standards of fairness, 
nondiscrimination, and due process are not respected.6 Modified 
universalism has been quite prevalent in practice, including where key 
international instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
 
(2011) (“The focus on which country would act as the home court was done in anticipation of that 
country applying its own laws, including choice of law rules.”); Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism 
and Choice of Law, 23 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 625, 634 (2005). Professor Westbrook observes: 
The emerging international rule in multinational bankruptcy cases focuses on the 
center of the debtor’s main interests. Up to now, that standard has been adopted 
primarily as a choice-of-forum rule rather than a choice-of-law rule, but it is necessary 
to use it for both purposes to achieve the goals of universalism. 
Id. 
5. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 32 (explaining that, for universalism to function, states must 
cooperate and offer their assistance, especially by recognizing and enforcing foreign proceedings); 
GOODE, supra note 3, at 786 (describing the key universalist elements, including recognition in 
other countries of the forum state’s judgments and assistance by local courts in asset recovery); 
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 345 (noting the necessity of international coordination and cooperation 
in the management of distressed financial institutions). 
6. Such circumstances can be grouped under the notion of “public policy”. 
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Border Insolvency (Model Law)7 and the EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR)8 
seem to generally follow its approach.9 There are, however, still gaps in the 
cross-border insolvency system and in the available frameworks (even where 
instruments seem to generally embrace modified universalism), including in 
terms of the entities covered and the participating countries.10 Generally, the 
 
7. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. 
E.14.V.2 (2014) (identifying as its four main features access to local courts for representatives of 
foreign proceedings; recognition of foreign proceedings; relief to assist foreign proceedings; and 
cooperation among courts and other competent authorities of the various states). 
8. See generally Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 19, 59 (EU) (repealing and recasting 
Council Regulation 1346/2000); Council Regulation 1346/2000 of May 29, 2000, on Insolvency 
Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). The Council Regulation observes: 
The proper functioning of the internal market requires that cross-border insolvency 
proceedings should operate efficiently and effectively and this Regulation needs to 
be adopted in order to achieve this objective . . . . [T]here is a need for a 
Community act requiring coordination of the measures to be taken regarding an 
insolvent debtor’s assets. 
Id. The Recast EIR entered into force on June 26, 2017. Id. at 56. The regime applies directly to all 
EU member states except Denmark, which opted out. Id. at 29. 
9. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 785–86 (“The current trend, as exemplified by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the EC Insolvency Regulation . . . is clearly in favour 
of a modified universalist approach . . . .”). 
10. For example, the Model Law has been adopted by only 45 jurisdictions. U.N. Comm’n on 
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status of modified universalism is somewhat amorphous, and its norms are 
often perceived as broad principles or aspects of a general trend.11 
This Article considers how modified universalism may be elevated from 
a broad approach to a recognized, international legal source that can be 
invoked and applied in a more concrete and consistent manner across legal 
systems in circumstances of international insolvencies alongside the 
application of written instruments where such instruments exist.12 It draws 
from sources of international law, specifically the concept of customary 
 
Int’l Trade Law, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html 
[https://perma.cc/N7SN-V8UT]; it does not fully cover the cross-border insolvency and resolution 
of financial institutions- indeed, the absence of a uniform framework for cross-border insolvency of 
such institutions is a major gap in the international system for cross-border insolvency and 
resolution, Irit Mevorach, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border 
Resolution Gap, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 184, 218 n.160 (2015), and it does not 
fully or expressly cover all aspects of cross-border insolvency (for example, it does not provide 
specific rules concerning choice of law). 
11. See for example the references of the U.K. court in In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd. [2008] 
UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 (appeal taken from Eng.), to a “principle rather than a rule,” an 
“aspiration,” and a “thread” or the reference of the U.S. court in In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532 
B.R. 494, 558 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), to “terms such as ‘universalism.’” 
12. I address the question of instrument choice, particularly the choice between a treaty regime 
or a regime based on a model law for cross-border insolvency, in IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 127–68 (2018). 
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international law (CIL), and shows that CIL is a key legal source that can fill 
gaps in international instruments, influence existing instruments, and 
regulate in areas not covered by instruments or regarding countries that are 
not parties to them. CIL is also useful in taking into account certain biases 
and territorial inclinations that can influence countries and implementing 
institutions’ decisions and that can, therefore, impede movement towards the 
universal application of modified universalism.13 CIL is a “debiasing” 
measure where its application does not require active action by all 
participants, such as entry into a treaty or enactment of model laws, as it 
operates as a default (opt-out) rule. It can thus overcome certain robust biases 
such as status quo and loss aversion.14 
 
13. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing the “prospect theory” in decision-
making scholarship); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1124 (1974) (showing how choices and decisions are strongly biased 
and often deviate in predictable ways from economically optimal behavior). “Behavioral 
international law” provides further theoretical grounds and indicative studies regarding the 
application of recognized biases in international law contexts. See generally Anne van Aaken, 
Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude, 
Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (showing that bounds on decision-
making may operate when actors in international law make decisions concerning international law 
issues). 
14. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
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The normative implication is a policy push towards the transformation 
of modified universalism into CIL so that it can become part of the 
international insolvency legal order. This Article thus explores to what extent 
CIL can be utilized in the field of cross-border insolvency and considers 
possible obstacles in this regard. It proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the 
notion of CIL, including how it is formed and applied, its limitations and its 
continued significance. Part II considers the advantages of CIL from a 
behavioral perspective as a debiasing mechanism. Part III explores the 
obstacles that might be in the way of formalizing modified universalism as 
CIL in view of possible narrow perceptions of private international law and 
cross-border insolvency, as well as the way modified universalism has been 
conceptualized as an interim approach. Part IV argues that such perceptions 
are no longer merited. Cross-border insolvency law has a significant 
international role, and modified universalism has the characteristics of a 
standalone norm. Part V suggests steps to transition modified universalism 
from a general trend to CIL and demonstrates the benefits of such 
development for future international insolvencies. 
 
STUD. 199 (2006) (analyzing how “debiasing” through law could work to address a variety of legal 
questions). In the context of international law, see generally van Aaken, supra note 13, at 449. See 
also infra Part II. 
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I. Customary International Law as a Key International Legal Source 
A. Establishing CIL 
CIL is one of the key sources of international law,15 widely 
acknowledged, and applicable in different legal traditions.16 It has a 
privileged position in the international law system and forms the backbone 
of many areas of international law.17 CIL arises from the general and 
consistent practice of states, where that practice is based on a belief in the 
conformity of the practice with international law.18 This is the classical 
 
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (San Francisco, 26 June 1945), 3 Bevans 
1179, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945. CIL is considered one of the 
three primary sources of international law, the other two being treaties and general principles of 
law. See Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
89, 89 (2011) (noting the centrality to the international order of both custom and treaty). “General 
principles of law” is a source close to CIL but one that refers to fundamental principles concerning 
substantive justice and procedural fairness and by which states are bound because of the universal 
understanding of basic legal concepts by all legal systems. Charles T. Kotuby Jr., General 
Principles of Law, International Due Process, and the Modern Role of Private International Law, 
23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 411, 412, 422 (2013). 
16. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 43–44 (1985). 
17. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 
(2005). 
18. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF PEACE 59–60 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (“Evidence that a custom in this 
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understanding of CIL, consistent with its description in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice as “evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”19 It encompasses objective and subjective elements, which are 
complementary and intertwined.20 The objective element of CIL requires 
sufficient evidence of state practice that follows the potential CIL.21 Such 
evidence should show consistency and practice by various relevant actors, 
although not necessarily by all countries.22 Additionally, the required 
recurrence of the practice may depend on the frequency of circumstances that 
 
sense exists in the international sphere can be found only by examining the practice of states . . . 
whether they recognize an obligation to adopt a certain course . . . [that] shows ‘a general practice 
accepted as law.’”); VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (2007) (describing the two 
essential components of customary international law: a general practice of states and a belief in the 
conformity of the practice with international law); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–91 (2014) (“It is in fact the consistency and repetition rather than the 
duration of the practice that carries the most weight.”). 
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (San Francisco, 26 June 1945), 3 
Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945. 
20. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 62. 
21. Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 100–05 
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014). 
22. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE 
L.J. 202, 210 (2011) (“It is not clear how much state practice is required in order to generate a rule 
of CIL, although most commentators agree that [it] must be ‘extensive’ or ‘widespread’ . . . .”) 
(citations omitted). 
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require action pursuant to the CIL.23 The subjective (psychological) element 
is what countries have accepted as law (opinio juris). Thus, evidence of state 
practice should be complemented by evidence that the practice is regarded as 
an expression of a rule of international law, a conviction that there was an 
obligation to follow the norm. 
The primary and most direct evidence of the existence of CIL would be 
the actions of countries through the acts of their organs. Thus, when a country 
acts in a legally significant way or refrains from acting, it contributes to the 
development of state practice accepted as law. Countries’ actions may be 
discerned, for example, from decisions to adopt certain legislation and from 
the decisions of national courts.24 Additionally, treaties and conventions may 
point to the existence of CIL.25 Various instruments that may be considered 
soft law may also provide evidence of an established CIL or contribute to the 
evolution of new CIL, being determinative of the opinio juris or of state 
 
23. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 65, 67. 
24. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 55 (Feb. 3). 
25. Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3); see 
THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 58–59 (describing the significance of the International Law 
Association’s Report on the Formation of Customary International Law in studying the relationship 
between state practice and opinio juris). 
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practice.26 Thus, a nonbinding instrument can have a legal effect on 
customary law. The wording in such an instrument is important because it 
must be “of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be 
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.”27 It would also be 
important to consider the level of support given to the instrument by countries 
and any statements accompanying such instrument that may be relevant to 
the assessment of countries’ beliefs about the conformity of the practice with 
international law.28 
B. Effect of CIL 
Once CIL has become pervasive enough, countries are bound by it 
regardless of whether they have codified the laws domestically or through 
treaties. Unanimity among all countries is not required for it to have a 
universal effect. Likewise, if an obligation is included in a treaty but also 
amounts to CIL, it will also bind countries that are not parties to the treaty.29 
 
26. Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 901, 904 (1999). 
27. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 72 
(Feb. 20); see Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 
130–33 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014) (describing the importance of wording in nonbinding 
instruments that may create customary law). 
28. Boyle, supra note 27, at 130–31. 
29. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 35–36. 
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Countries in some cases, however, may be exempted from CIL. Under the 
doctrine of the “persistent objector,”30 countries can consistently object to 
CIL (opt out) in its formative stages.31 The threshold for being regarded a 
persistent objector is, however, very high, and the objection should be made 
widely known.32 Persistent objections should also be made while the rule is 
still accumulating and before it becomes CIL. Thereafter, in principle, once 
the CIL is established, it is no longer possible to opt out of the rule except 
through specific bilateral agreements that establish a different rule.33 
CIL may be invoked in domestic or international tribunals, yet the 
application of CIL does not depend on establishing international enforcement 
mechanisms. Application heavily relies on domestic enforcement structures. 
Thus, all nations seem to accept that CIL forms an integral part of national 
 
30. See id. at 86–88 (providing an overview of the persistent objector doctrine). 
31. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 22, at 211; Guzman, supra note 17, at 164–65. 
32. Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 121, 129 (2010) (noting, for example, the circumstances in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 
Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 131 (Dec. 18), where it was ruled that “the ten-mile rule for the 
closing lines of bays ‘would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has 
always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast’”). 
33. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 88. 
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law34 and that courts should take judicial notice of CIL.35 When ascertaining 
the existence and nature of an alleged CIL, domestic courts may have 
recourse to various types of sources and authoritative material, including 
“international treaties and conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice and 
judicial decisions.”36 The actual implementation of CIL in national laws 
differs, however, to some extent, among jurisdictions.37 In civil law 
jurisdictions, the general rule is that CIL takes precedence over inconsistent 
ordinary national legislation and directly creates rights and duties within the 
territory.38 In common law jurisdictions, CIL is recognized as part and parcel 
of the legal system, and legislation is presumptively construed in a manner 
 
34. Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 412, 426 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014). 
35. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99–100 (7th ed. 2014) (describing the 
doctrine of incorporation, which holds that customary international law is automatically part of the 
local law without any need for constitutional ratification). 
36. The Cristina [1938] AC 485 (HL) 497 (appeal taken from Austl.). 
37. See SHAW, supra note 35, at 99–127 (providing an overview of the implementation of CIL 
in national laws). 
38. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Folz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 240, 245 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011) (describing CIL’s precedence over German statutes 
and its creation of rights and duties for Germans); Giuseppe Cataldi, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 328, 342–44 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011) (describing Italy’s practice 
of automatically incorporating CIL into its domestic legal system such that CIL assumes the force 
of constitutional law). 
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that would avoid a conflict with international law.39 
C. Limitations and Critique 
CIL tends to be vague, and the way it emerges is rather unclear.40 
Furthermore, because CIL is based on an evolving experience, it is evidently 
problematic to ascertain when rules have reached the stage where they can 
be applied as CIL.41 There is also a circularity problem. For a rule to qualify 
as CIL, countries should feel obligated to follow it, but how would countries 
feel such legal obligation before the rule becomes customary?42 This 
uncertainty, as well as CIL’s reliance on domestic enforcement mechanisms, 
also makes CIL prone to nonobservance, especially when it attempts to 
address difficult cross-border conflicts.43 There have also been challenges to 
CIL for lacking a coherent theory and doctrine.44 It is arguably impossible to 
 
39. For example, CIL is part of the public policy of the UK and part of the domestic law and 
does not necessitate the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure. SHAW, supra note 
35, at 99–100. 
40. Id. at 102. 
41. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 54–55. 
42. ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 66 (1971). 
43. See Barbara C. Matthews, Emerging Public International Banking Law? Lessons from the 
Law of the Sea Experience, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 539, 556–57 (2010) (describing the questionable 
level of domestic enforcement of CIL and detailing the difficulties of codifying the Law of the Sea). 
44. See THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 231 (noting that CIL is one of international law’s 
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observe the universe of countries’ practices to be able to ascertain whether 
references to CIL are made out of obligation.45 It has also been argued that 
CIL does not actually affect country behavior and has little impact in view of 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms on the international level.46 Another 
uncertainty revolves around the question of whose practice and opinion 
should be considered when attempting to identify the existence of CIL, 
including the extent to which non-state actors’ actions should be taken into 
account, which countries’ actions or omissions should be considered, and 
whether only the actions of countries that are affected or that are capable of 
taking action regarding a certain matter are relevant.47 There is also a risk that 
CIL is too sticky and fails to allow for developments to meet changing 
circumstances and new needs of countries and of the international business 
 
“intellectual puzzles”); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xiii (2d ed. 
1993) (describing the ambiguity of the term “custom” with regard to international law). 
45. See Guzman, supra note 17, at 150–53 (highlighting the numerous interpretations of state 
practice in discussions of CIL). 
46. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2005); 
see also Guzman, supra note 17, at 128 (discussing the argument that because CIL lacks an 
enforcement mechanism, CIL does not affect state behavior). 
47. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 59–61; see also Till Müller, Customary Transnational Law: 
Attacking the Last Resort of State Sovereignty, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 19, 28–30 (2008) 
(reviewing scholarship regarding non-state actors’ influence on the formation of CIL). 
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and financial community.48 
D. CIL’s Continued Significance 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that CIL presents, it continues to hold a 
privileged position in the international legal system.49 Furthermore, over time 
there has been some shift from relying only on induction from national 
practice in identifying CIL to deducing its emergence from broader data sets, 
including international pronouncements and activities of non-state actors.50 
Some scholars have also theorized CIL in functional terms, suggesting that 
CIL may be effective when countries interact repeatedly over time, and it 
may influence country behavior through reputational and direct sanctions.51 
It has also been considered that although the development of CIL might be a 
 
48. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 68. 
49. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State 
Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 309 (2007) (arguing that 
such unwritten international law not only counts but “may even gain importance”). 
50. See, e.g., Roozbeh B. Baker, Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization, 41 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 439, 446 (2016) (discussing the debate concerning “modern custom” and 
“traditional custom” viewpoints on customary international norms); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001) (describing the difference between traditional inductive and modern 
deductive methods of identifying custom). 
51. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 17, at 134, 139 (noting the role that reputational and direct 
sanctions play in compliance with CIL). 
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slow process, with technological changes, the rise of international 
institutions, and other developments, CIL may emerge more quickly than in 
the past.52 The works of influential international committees of recent times 
provide further guidance regarding the manner of CIL formation and 
identification.53 Importantly, regarding the subjective acceptance of CIL, it is 
explained that it should be “distinguished from mere usage or habit”54 and 
may be negated where it can be shown that participants, when acting in a 
particular way, were motivated by considerations such as courtesy, 
convenience, or tradition rather than by a conviction that their acts amounted 
to CIL.55 
 
52. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in 
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 532 (Ronald MacDonald & Douglas 
M. Johnston eds., 1983) (“[C]ustomary international law, instead of being sluggish and backward 
as a source of international law, is in fact dynamic, living, and ever-changing . . . .”). 
53. See generally Int’l Law Ass’n, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law, Final Report of the Committee, London Conference (2000) 
[hereinafter Statement of Principles] (attempting to create a practical guide with concise and clear 
guidelines for the application of customary international law principles); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally 
Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 (May 30, 2016) [hereinafter Draft 
Conclusions] (describing the way in which the rules of customary international law are determined). 
54. Draft Conclusions, supra note 53, at 3. 
55. See Statement of Principles, supra note 53, at 35 (describing the practice of sending 
condolences on the death of a head of state as an example of a practice that, although frequently 
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It is recognized that CIL is binding on all countries whether or not they 
participated in the relevant practice. Any country in theory can affect CIL, 
and the position of countries may be considered even where they could not 
in fact take or refrain from taking an action.56 Surely, where countries do 
possess the capacity to engage and interact with other parties, such countries 
would be more influential and thus privileged regarding the formation and 
shaping of CIL. However, the reliance of international law on the practice of 
the more powerful countries can ensure fewer deviations from and violations 
of CIL where such countries formed the rules. Constraining violations by 
powerful countries is crucial for the stability of the system, as the impact of 
breach could be much more pronounced and widespread when committed by 
such jurisdictions. In addition, because powerful countries are less affected 
 
observed as a matter of comity, does not give rise to a legal obligation); see also North Sea 
Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20). The court 
noted: 
The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are 
many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are 
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of 
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty. 
56. See THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 59–60 (noting, as to the question of whether customary 
international law existed with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, the fact that a majority of states 
did not possess nuclear weapons and could therefore neither choose to use them nor refrain from 
using them). 
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by CIL violations (as they are more resilient to the implications of a breach), 
they may be less deterred by them. Therefore, it is another advantage if these 
countries play an important role in shaping the rules.57 
Today, treaty law covers many areas of international law. There are also 
various other ways for countries to cooperate through soft-law instruments.58 
However, CIL remains binding on countries even outside the treaty 
framework. The two sources operate in parallel, and the codification of CIL 
in a treaty does not abrogate the rule as CIL.59 CIL still plays an important 
role “regulating both within the gaps of treaties as well as the conduct of non-
parties to the treaties”60 because countries are bound by CIL even if they have 
not expressed explicit consent. The effect of CIL is also important regarding 
 
57. Guzman, supra note 17, at 151. 
58. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 
614 (2005) (concluding that there has been a dramatic increase in international cooperation through 
contracts, unwritten understandings, and pledges). 
59. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 177 (June 27). The Court held: 
[E]ven if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly the same 
content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of the 
customary norm into treaty-law must deprive the customary norm of its applicability 
as distinct from that of the treaty norm. 
Id. 
60. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 22, at 209. 
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matters that are not regulated by treaties or by other instruments and for 
newly emerging issues not yet covered by a treaty.61 In addition, CIL can 
serve to influence treaty regimes and may be important and relevant for treaty 
interpretation where, for example, the treaty refers to rules of CIL.62 Thus, 
important areas of international law, including the law of state responsibility, 
foreign direct investment, diplomatic immunity, human rights, and state 
immunity,63 are governed wholly or partially by CIL where treaties are not 
universal, where a treaty is absent, or where the treaty does not cover all 
issues. CIL is in use, for example, in international investment law where 
certain aspects of regulating foreign investment have become settled 
international law64 and where CIL remains of fundamental importance 
 
61. Where both a treaty and CIL regulate the same situation, normally the treaty is the prevailing 
lex specialis, at least regarding rules that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. See 
Thirlway, supra note 21, at 108–09 (observing that even in a situation where customary law exists 
alongside treaty law, no problem of theory is raised, since the latter is free to modify customary 
entitlements). 
62. Guzman, supra note 17, at 120 & n.18 (noting the example of the United States Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. II (Apr. 1994), which refers to “treatment less favorable than that 
required by [customary] international law”). 
63. Id. at 116 n.1. 
64. See Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International Law in 
International Investments Law?, 28 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 675, 676–78 (2010) (describing the role 
of custom as a source of international law in the regulation of foreign investment). 
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despite the proliferation of bilateral investment agreements in this field.65 
E. CIL’s Relevance to the Cross-Border Insolvency System 
The nature and characteristics of CIL make it an important legal source 
for a cross-border insolvency system based on modified universalism and a 
useful method to shape the international interactions in this subsystem of 
international law. CIL is responsive to emerging trends in practice. It is based 
on experience, and it can arise whether written instruments are applicable or 
not. It applies to all countries, whereby treaties or other instruments apply 
only to signatories or countries that adopted the instruments. Thus, if 
modified universalism is recognized as CIL, gaps in the cross-border 
insolvency system can be filled. Modified universalism is also sufficiently 
flexible—its emerging norms accommodate different types of business 
structures and different degrees of global or regional integration, and it can 
also adapt to changing conditions. Thus, it is akin to CIL, which as a legal 
source tends to be supple and adaptable. CIL is also not too rigid as a legal 
 
65. CIL in this field includes, inter alia, the requirement of nondiscrimination, the fair and 
equitable treatment of foreign investors, the entitlement of foreign investors to national treatment 
once admitted into the country, and the requirement regarding nondiscriminatory regulatory 
measures and obligations to respect human rights by multinational companies. For more detail, see 
Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 727, 740–41 (Malcolm D. 
Evans ed., 2014). These rules may apply in the absence of a bilateral agreement, where agreements 
make reference to CIL, or to fill gaps in treaties when treaties are silent on certain issues. 
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source, notwithstanding its universal application through general experience. 
It can develop gradually over time, and it is possible to change or create new 
CIL to meet the developing needs of nations.66 Thus, conduct inconsistent 
with CIL may in relevant circumstances be a way to create new rules.67 At 
the same time, where CIL represents an emerging, widespread, and 
normatively desirable practice, its tendency to stick is an important 
advantage.68 
II. The Behavioral Force of CIL 
A. CIL as a Debiasing Mechanism 
CIL can also assist in overcoming territorial inclinations and biases.69 
 
66. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 69; cf. id. at 102 (noting the permanent nature of general 
principles of law). 
67. The ICJ explained in this regard that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards 
a modification of customary international law.” Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27). 
68. Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom: Choosing Between Default Rules, 21 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 55 (2010) (“If customary international law already incorporates rules that 
are net welfare increasing for the international community, then a shift towards the [provision of 
more opt-out rights, including after formation,] may be welfare decreasing.”). 
69. For more detail on the possible operation of biases and bounds on decision-making in 
international law, and specifically in cross-border insolvency, see MEVORACH, supra note 12, at 
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Decision-makers, including actors making choices regarding issues of 
international law, may be inclined to avoid changes and cling to the status 
quo, especially where choices of certain options are perceived as resulting in 
a loss (e.g., loss of sovereignty or control over locally situated assets or 
entities), and more so if the choice requires active action.70 Additionally, the 
way options are framed matter to people’s choices. Specifically, cognitive 
psychology studies have shown the effect of legislative framing and the use 
of default options on choices between alternative options.71 It has been 
shown, for example, that people favor agreements that are consistent with 
 
49–79. 
70. The existence of loss aversion, whereby losses are exaggerated and given greater weight 
than gains, and its link to a status quo bias and the endowment effect, has been observed in a wealth 
of empirical research, including neurobiological experiments, which showed that this pattern of 
behavior (responding differently to perceived losses as opposed to perceived gains, measured 
against a perceived status quo position) is tied to the brain’s greater sensitivity to potential losses 
than to gains; experimental studies have also shown that loss aversion has a specific effect when 
considering avoiding an option verses actively approaching an option. See generally Nicholas D. 
Wright et al., Approach-Avoidance Processes Contribute to Dissociable Impacts of Risk and Loss 
on Choice, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7009 (2012); Nicholas D. Wright et al., Manipulating the 
Contribution of Approach-Avoidance to the Perturbation of Economic Choice by Valence, 7 
FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013). 
71. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199 (1991) (pointing to studies showing the effect of such 
manipulation on a choice between alternative automobile insurance policies). 
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legal default rules or terms of trade that are conventional for the type of 
bargain at issue.72 This may be due to the stress or sometimes physical effort 
involved in making changes, but it is also likely because defaults tend to be 
perceived as representing the existing status quo and the recommended, 
endorsed option.73 Furthermore, switching from a default option may be 
perceived as a risk and a loss; thus, it may be weighed more heavily than the 
possible gains because of loss aversion.74 Empirical research in international 
law concerning adherence to options in treaties has also shown the significant 
impact of default rules, which were likely perceived as the endorsed status 
 
72. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 662 (2006) (explaining that a deviation from default terms can raise 
suspicion among parties); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1343–44 (1990) (concluding that participants’ 
preferences were dependent upon their reference positions); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias 
and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 646–47 (1998) (stating that participants of 
the experiment preferred whichever contract term was the default term given). 
73. See, e.g., John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings 
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., SOCIAL SECURITY 
POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167, 184–87 (Jeffrey R. Brown et al. eds., 2009) 
(describing this phenomenon in the context of experiments studying individuals’ investment 
decisions regarding their savings plans). 
74. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338 
(2003). 
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quo position, on countries’ (and their implementing institutions’) choices.75 
More generally, behavioral international law studies have noted the 
importance of default mechanisms in choice architecture in international 
law.76 Thus, a rule can be set up as an opt-out rule or an opt-in rule. An opt-
in rule means that the default is nonadherence to the rule. In an opt-out 
scheme, the default is adherence. If people tend not to deviate from default 
rules, there is an advantage in setting up opt-out rules, especially where 
universality of the application of the rule is critical. Thus, if sources of 
international law that provide an opt-out system are used, higher participation 
can be expected in comparison to opt-in systems. 
CIL can be particularly advantageous as a debiasing mechanism of 
international law because CIL is an opt-out system where countries are bound 
by such CIL that has developed through the general practice of nations. 
Although CIL emerges from the consistent practice of countries, it is not a 
 
75. Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 
VA. J. INT’L L. 309, 352 (2013). 
76. See Broude, supra note 13, at 1140–41 (noting how individuals have a tendency to adopt 
default rules even when they are inefficient); van Aaken, supra note 13, at 450–52 (explaining how 
choice architecture, through default rules’ opt-in/opt-out mechanisms, provides a framework 
through which to view international law). Choice architecture is the study of how the ways in which 
options are presented affect decision-making. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2009) (defining a choice 
architect as someone responsible for organizing the context of decision-making). 
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consensual mechanism. It does not require that countries agree to or enact the 
rule and as such does not represent a deviation from the status quo. The 
existence of CIL is based on an understanding that it is a norm of the 
international community. This does not necessarily mean, though, that a 
given country consents to the norm. Rather, the acceptance of the binding 
rule must be felt by countries generally.77 Critically, to not be bound by the 
rule, a country needs to actively object to it.78 As such, CIL is a mechanism 
of international cooperation that can promote universal application of the 
norm because opt-out rules are expected to increase participation, particularly 
on the global level, in the absence of mechanisms to impose regulation 
directly on countries’ legal systems. It might be harder to ensure universal 
application through, for example, treaties, as treaties require an active opt-in. 
The fact that CIL requires adherence (or objection) to the rule in its entirety 
also promotes integrity in its application.79 Thus, with no room for cherry-
picking, it is more likely that the norm will remain uniform and coherent. 
 
77. Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 776 (2012). 
78. The emergence of the persistent objector doctrine, see supra note 30 and accompanying 
text, may have been part of an effort to make international law less consensual. Bradley & Gulati, 
supra note 22, at 240. 
79. Van Aaken, supra note 13, at 452. 
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B. CIL: Shifting the Reference Point  
Outcomes are perceived as gains or losses usually relative to a reference 
point that people denote during the decision-making process, “rather than as 
final states of wealth or welfare.”80 The reference point usually corresponds 
to the current asset position (status quo) whereby gains/losses are deviations 
from the reference point.81 Thus, a negative perception of modified 
universalism outcomes is expected particularly where the country’s reference 
point is a regime generally based on territorialism, namely if the country does 
not have an established internationalist approach in its domestic methods for 
addressing cross-border insolvency. A modified universalist CIL can, in 
addition to applying directly in areas not covered by treaties or other 
instruments, also indirectly promote the adoption of instruments (such as the 
Model Law) where these instruments reflect modified universalism. A strong 
leading norm, elevated from a trend to CIL, may gradually affect the 
reference points of countries and implementing institutions and level the 
playing field. When recognized as CIL, countries may feel more obliged to 
follow modified universalism and, over time, assimilate it into the legal 
system. Thus, adherence to instruments that are premised on modified 
 
80. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 13, at 274. Values are attached to changes rather than to 
final states, and the perception of changes is also affected by past and present context of experience. 
Id. at 274, 277. 
81.  Id. at 274. 
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universalism would less likely be perceived as a change and as a loss. 
III. Conceptual Impediments 
A. Public and Private International Law as Distinct Disciplines 
Notwithstanding the rather widespread adherence to modified 
universalism, it has not been invoked or applied as CIL. Modified 
universalism is not explicitly embraced in the global instruments for cross-
border insolvency. Courts in common law jurisdictions often apply common 
law notions akin to a universalist/cooperative approach, noting that modified 
universalism is recognized as a broad principle under common law, or they 
apply the notion of comity. Yet, comity entails different interpretations and 
is not universal.82 Modified universalism that could be applied as a universal 
and uniform norm has usually been considered a broad concept within the 
constraints of domestic, private international law to the extent that if we were 
to try identifying it now as CIL, it would be difficult to show consistent 
practice that is based on belief in the conformity of the practice with 
international law, and therefore CIL might be disproved. The problem could 
lie in a narrow perception of cross-border insolvency law as a legal field 
addressing procedures and technicalities. Because cross-border insolvency 
 
82. It generally refers to the tradition among judges within the common law camp to cooperate 
and assist foreign jurisdictions. See FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 17 (contrasting comity with 
insularity). But its precise meaning is quite elusive. 
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law primarily regulates the private international law of insolvency, it can be 
understood as a field disconnected from public international law and public 
international law sources. As such, cross-border insolvency law might not be 
sufficiently influenced by international laws and might not engage in creating 
CIL. 
The relation between private and public international law has been a 
subject of much debate and considerable theoretical development.83 In the 
early nineteenth century, private international law was perceived as a 
category and an integral part of public international law pursuant to the idea 
of a unitary international law based on the traditions of Roman jus gentium, 
the Statutists, and the natural law; in the latter half of that century, it evolved 
 
83. See, e.g., K. LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL 63–64 (1981) (examining the influence of public international law on its private 
counterpart); Kotuby, supra note 15, at 411–12, 433 (2013) (noting the increasingly global discourse 
surrounding private international law); Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: 
German Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 121, 121–22 (2008) (describing scholars’ 
different perspectives on public and private international law depending on their geographical and 
historical context); Ole Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 785, 788–89, 792 (2007) (providing an historical overview of public and private international 
law); John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International 
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 564–67 (1952) (analyzing the diverse views of scholars regarding 
the proper relationship between public and private international law). 
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and crystallized as a separate field with a distinct role.84 Pursuant to this 
(modern) traditional separation of roles, public international law governs the 
relations between nations, provides a legal framework for organized 
international relations, and addresses the rights and obligations of countries 
with respect to other countries or individuals. Private international law, on 
the other hand, deals with the domestic laws of countries that govern conflicts 
between private persons. Against this backdrop, it has been doubted that rules 
that are fundamental to private international law (e.g., the rule that rights in 
rem as applied to immovable and movable property are governed by the lex 
situs, or that form is governed by the lex loci actus) could and have generated 
customary (public) international law.85 
Generally, the traditional division between private and public 
international law and the evolution of private international law as a domestic 
legal order regulating in the domain of private interests contributed to the 
gradual isolation of private international law from public international law 
and the general exclusion of a role for international sources.86 This model has 
 
84. See generally Stevenson, supra note 83 (describing the historical relationship between 
private and public international law). 
85. PAVEL KALENSKY, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 17–18 (1971); LIPSTEIN, 
supra note 83, at 64–65. 
86. See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 44–45 
(2006) (“By defining private international law as part of domestic law, it defines private 
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resulted in a private international law system that does not contribute much 
to the ordering of international private relations but instead often adds to the 
complexity of international transactions—as private international laws of 
different systems often conflict or operate with broad exceptions, creating 
uncertainty and costs.87 This division of roles between private and public 
international law also arguably constrains the ability to regulate the important 
domain of private international interaction in view of the operation of private 
power in the global economy.88 
B. Cross-Border Insolvency as a System of Procedural Private 
International Law 
That cross-border insolvency is a body of specific and narrow rules 
concerning insolvency procedures has been a common understanding and 
description of this area of the law.89 Often, international insolvency does not 
exist as a “systematically elaborated legal framework” and the domestic 
 
international lawyers as domestic, not international; it emphasizes their attachment to a sovereign 
territory.”). 
87. Id. at 45–46. 
88. A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in 
International Law, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 261, 279 (1997); Mills, supra note 86, at 46. 
89.  BOB WESSELS, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 1 (4th ed. 2015). 
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private international laws apply.90 Cross-border insolvency has been 
generally regarded as “an arcane and rarified area of specialisation.”91 
Narrow assumptions concerning the role of cross-border insolvency have 
been notable in the practice and observed in the Eighties and early Nineties. 
It has been noted that countries have generally presumed that international 
insolvency is an aspect of private law.92 Such views resulted in limited 
interest of countries in the field of cross-border insolvency where countries 
have confined their role to the regulation of procedure concerning 
international insolvency. This peripheral interest of governments has also 
arguably constrained negotiations on insolvency treaties and could explain 
the general failure in concluding treaties in this field.93 
The approach to cross-border insolvency has evolved over time, and 
importantly, there has been growing recognition of the difficulty to control 
cross-border insolvencies efficiently by relying on the domestic private 
international laws of national systems. It has been acknowledged that 
 
90. Id. at 4. 
91. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
92.  Id. at 5. 
93. Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It 
Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT’L LAW. 881, 897 (1993); John Honsberger, The Negotiation of a 
Bankruptcy Treaty (1985), reprinted in MEREDITH MEMORIAL LECTURES: BANKRUPTCY—
PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 287, 291 (1986). 
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domestic private international laws related to insolvency have preserved the 
problem of diversity and conflicts between national laws.94 Consequently, 
hugely influential uniform frameworks have emerged, notably the Model 
Law. Yet, as international instruments that attempt to regulate the specialized 
field of cross-border insolvency, they, too, can be understood as merely 
providing certain tools to address private international procedures more 
efficiently but not as creating general norms that intend to influence 
substantive results.95 The important framework for cross-border insolvency 
applicable in Europe (the EIR) has also evolved as an aspect of the European 
Community private international law system.96 It has been observed that the 
European insolvency framework has not provided a uniform and 
comprehensive legal framework.97 In all, the important advance of cross-
border insolvency regimes has been tempered by a modest approach 
concerning the role of cross-border insolvency law and of the frameworks 
that are being devised to govern cross-border insolvency cases. 
 
94. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
95. See, e.g., Bank of W. Austl. v. David Stewart Henderson [No. 3] [2011] FMCA 840, ¶ 43 
(Austl.) (“[The Model Law] was promoted as having a procedural effect as opposed to a substantive 
effect that might have included automatic recognition and enforcement or effects.”). 
96.  WESSELS, supra note 89, at 6. 
97.  Id. at 7. 
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C. Modified Universalism as a Transitory Approach 
A tendency to underrate the role of cross-border insolvency is 
exacerbated where modified universalism is perceived as an interim solution, 
inextricably linked to the aspiration to achieve pure universalism.98 At least 
in theory, pure universalism is often considered the ultimate ideal for 
regulating cross-border insolvency and modified universalism the best 
solution pending movement to true universalism.99 Modified universalism is 
thought to provide a pragmatic transitory approach whilst country laws still 
differ and could foster the smoothest transition to true universalism.100 
It is inevitable, however, that whilst modified universalism remains 
conceptually transitory, its ability to solidify and become CIL is undermined. 
CIL must represent settled obligatory practice;101 therefore, a transitory 
doctrine would be an oxymoron. True, rules or principles of a temporary 
character may stay in such an interim state for a long time and until a new 
regime develops. CIL can change, and new CIL can emerge when conduct 
inconsistent with it may in relevant circumstances show the appearance of 
new rules. CIL does not have to stay still. Yet, for CIL to emerge in the first 
 
98. For discussion of the proposition that cross-border insolvencies should always be unitary 
and universal, see BORK, supra note 3, at 28–29; FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 11. 
99. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 2277. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra subpart I(A). 
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place, it should be demonstrated that it is followed consistently based on the 
belief about the conformity of the practice with international law. It may be 
difficult to form such type of law, however, where modified universalism is 
in this midpoint between an interim solution and a fundamental norm and is 
conceptually linked to another presumably better approach, thus representing 
a transitory stage in the development of more ideal rules. 
IV. Reconceptualization: The International Role of Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
A. Internationalization of Private International Law 
Gradually since the twentieth century, and more so in recent decades, 
the division between private and public international law has become 
uncertain and blurred.102 The traditional separation of roles of the two fields 
no longer fits with the current state of globalization or with modern 
intervention by countries in terms of regulating private market activities, 
 
102. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 83, at 121–22 (discussing the recent trend toward merging 
the fields of private and public international law); Spiermann, supra note 83, at 793–94 (“The 
‘internationalist’ school according to which private international law was part and parcel of public 
international law still claimed many followers in early 20th century theory.”). See generally ALEX 
MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (challenging the 
distinction normally drawn between public and private international law by exploring the ways in 
which the former shapes, and is given effect by, the latter). 
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adding a public component or public-interest component to private business 
law.103 The conceptualization of the relationship between private and public 
international law and of the role of private international law is in a state of 
evolution, too, because of these changes in world realities. It is becoming 
clear that private international law of a narrow character cannot properly 
address modern challenges in an increasingly interconnected world.104 It has 
been noted that while international disputes in the past were largely limited 
to regional relations among close legal systems, the discourse has become 
truly global in recent decades.105 Therefore, private international law should 
not be perceived as a mere system of technical rules regarding the proper 
forum, law, and the facilitation of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.106 Furthermore, private international law should not insulate itself 
and attempt to regulate private interactions separately from the broader 
international order, as such isolation obscures the operation of private power 
 
103. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 83, at 122–23 (discussing how the distinction between 
private and public international law has become less clear). 
104. Kotuby, supra note 15, at 411–12. 
105. Id. 
106. See id. at 412 (arguing that private international law should have an interest and a 
meaningful role to play in identifying and ensuring compliance with general international principles 
regarding the way transnational disputes are resolved). 
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in the global political economy.107 
There are also growing overlaps and intersections of the roles of each 
field in practice. Thus, public international law shows a rising interest in 
economic relations, and multinational corporations and individuals are no 
longer outside its remit.108 It has also been noted that public international law 
is becoming domesticated and more technical.109 Importantly, the result of 
increasing intersections and overlaps between private and public 
international law has been a gradual expansion of the role and scope of 
private international law.110 Thus, many of the tasks of private international 
law, for example, its dealing with recent problems of sovereign state 
insolvency, might have previously been viewed as belonging to public 
international law.111 
Movement towards the internationalization of private international law 
 
107. See Cutler, supra note 88, at 279 (“[T]he public/private distinction operates ideologically 
to obscure the operation of private power in the global political economy.”). 
108. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (discussing the need for a coherent theory of compliance given 
international law’s increased pertinence to global economic and business relations). 
109. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is 
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 327 (2006). 
110. Michaels, supra note 83, at 123. 
111. Id. at 137. 
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has been apparent for some time with the conclusion of treaties and other 
international instruments in recent years on matters of jurisdiction, choice of 
law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.112 This trend has 
coincided with the internationalization of national economies and their 
increased interdependence. Internationalization can also be seen in the rise of 
international commercial law and its development from the early stages of 
the Merchant Law to modern legal orders on a transnational scale.113 
International organizations have been playing a significant part. For example, 
UNCITRAL has been charged with the task of coordinating global law 
reform to support international trade.114 In this gradual reunification of 
 
112. See generally Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 (EU) (recognizing that an 
international agreement is necessary to effectuate cross-border insolvency proceedings); Council 
Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 3 (EU) (promulgating rules and principles for 
jurisdictional issues and for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in international civil and 
commercial matters); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. 
E.14.V.2 (2014) (identifying as its purpose the provision of “effective mechanisms for dealing with 
cases of cross-border insolvency”); THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
https://www.hcch.net/ [https://perma.cc/7RG9-42PS]. 
113. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions, 2 EMORY J. INT’L 
DISP. RESOL. 235, 243 (1988). For a summary of these developments, see Rosalind Mason, Cross-
Border Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation, 21 INT’L INSOLV. REV. 105, 108–12 (2012). 
114. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), at ¶ 8 (Dec. 16, 1966) (directing UNCITRAL to engage in a 
variety of tasks to “further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international 
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private and public international law, private international law is not 
swallowed by or fully merged with public international law. Rather, its role 
and scope are augmented.115 
B. Substantive and International Impact of Cross-Border Insolvency 
The increased role of private international law and the relevance of 
public-international-law sources to the mission of private international law 
should be highlighted more in the context of cross-border insolvency. A 
broad internationalist approach assigned to private international law is 
particularly justified in the field of insolvency where private and public 
interests intersect: insolvency law is considered “meta-law.”116 Insolvency 
principles are closely linked to fundamental public policy and social goals, 
and insolvency outcomes can impact the economy and the wider public.117 
 
trade”). 
115. Michaels, supra note 83, at 137–38; see also Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and 
Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of 
Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 219–20 (2002) (describing the doctrinal reforms 
in private international law). 
116. Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (1996). 
117. The claim that insolvency law’s role is merely procedural and should be confined to the 
respect of pre-acquired rights through orderly distribution of the estate has been strongly rejected 
by proponents of the “traditionalist” approach. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 
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Cross-border insolvency law is not merely procedural but also affects 
substantive rights, even where it is mainly confined to the harmonization of 
private international laws pertaining to insolvency.118 Through a cross-border 
insolvency framework, it is possible to enforce a collective insolvency 
process on the global level, including by requiring the transfer of assets to the 
central proceedings and imposing additional duties and requirements 
regarding the conduct of such proceedings with the important substantive 
result of equitable treatment of creditors wherever located. Cross-border 
insolvency can also do more than connect national legal systems. It can 
engage in the identification of best practices and in the formulation of 
international standards, and it can prevent financial collapse.119 
Cross-border insolvency is of a true international nature, as many cases 
of general default involve multinational enterprises with branches and 
subsidiaries spanning multiple countries. The way a court or authority in one 
country handles international insolvency cases often has significant 
 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). Cf. Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the 
Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 75 (1985) (contending that the traditional approach to 
bankruptcy distributes assets in a suboptimal way that is different from how a sole owner would 
have them distributed). 
118. See BORK, supra note 3, at 17–18, 113–14 (setting out the various procedural and 
substantive aspects of insolvency law). 
119. WESSELS, supra note 89, at 2–3. 
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implications across borders in numerous jurisdictions, affecting a broad range 
of stakeholders. As aforementioned, the administration of cross-border 
insolvencies can also have an impact on the public and the economy at 
large.120 Indeed, international insolvencies and, to an even larger extent, 
multinational defaults of financial institutions often not only affect the private 
business community but might influence wider public interests and even 
threaten the economic and political stability of nation-states.121 The collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and other institutions during the global financial crisis 
are notable examples.122 The insolvency of Hanjin Shipping in 2016, as well, 
is an example of how the filing of bankruptcy in one jurisdiction can present 
paramount global challenges. There, it was a matter of public interest that the 
South Korean proceedings be swiftly recognized so that cargo worth millions 
of dollars could resume moving to its various destinations.123 
 
120. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border 
Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 935 (1994) (commenting that “[b]ankruptcy law has become 
so important to the national economy that reform no longer can be left to a few academics and 
insolvency practitioners”). 
121. Gaa, supra note 93, at 909. 
122. The collapse of Lehman Brothers nearly brought down the world’s financial system in 
2008. Mevorach, supra note 10, at 194. 
123.  The former General Counsel for Hanjin Shipping America noted: 
When Hanjin Shipping, once the seventh largest container carrier in the world and the 
fourth largest container carriers in the transpacific (Asia – U.S. & Canada) trade, filed for 
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The international insolvency regime is a critical component of the 
international economic framework. The effective resolution of cross-border 
insolvency contributes to international trade and investment, as the United 
Nations General Assembly acknowledged when initiating the work in this 
field.124 Cross-border insolvency of banks and other financial institutions is 
also an integral aspect of the global financial system and the architecture of 
international financial law.125 Already, and for several decades now, 
transnational actors have been engaged in the creation of standards in 
insolvency and the development of frameworks for cross-border insolvency. 
 
bankruptcy, few believed that a ‘too big to fail’ organization like Hanjin would not be 
given a government bail-out. So, naturally, no one really appreciated the kind of disruption 
and losses that would subsequently affect the global supply chain. 
Wook Chung, Hanjin Shipping: From the Eye of the Storm and Back, MARINE LOG (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=25323:hanjin-shipping-
from-the-eye-of-the-storm-and-back&Itemid=230 [https://perma.cc/5J2F-S46U]. 
124. See G.A. Res. 52/158, ¶ 6 (Dec. 15, 1997) (resolving that the UN is “convinced that fair 
and internationally harmonized legislation on cross-border insolvency that respects the national 
procedural and judicial systems and is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic 
systems would contribute to the development of international trade and investment”). 
125. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 233–34, 319–24 (2015) (“Cross-Border bankruptcy has been largely 
operationalized as an outgrowth of domestic (national policy). . . . [and] authorities have begun to 
coordinate . . . how cooperation would arise between jurisdictions should a multinational bank or 
firm fail.”). 
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Against the backdrop of the general evolution of private international law, 
such work on international frameworks for insolvency should continue to 
develop within their broader international context. 
C. Separation of Modified Universalism from the Pure Theory of 
Universalism 
In accordance with its international role, the cross-border insolvency 
system should strive to transform modified universalism to an established, 
binding CIL. Conceptually, this requires that modified universalism is no 
longer regarded as a transitory doctrine linked to pure universalism but rather 
a standalone norm. Such conceptual separation is also justified where it is 
modified universalism that provides concrete rules fitting with business and 
legal realities, thus guiding parties in actual cases. Pure universalism offers 
the most viable theoretical model for cross-border insolvency when it 
envisages a collective process on the global level encompassing all 
stakeholders whose interests are implicated and all assets wherever located. 
Yet modified universalism translates the model to a practical approach.126 
Would such conceptual separation risk, however, the further spread and 
application of universalism? Arguably, formalizing modified universalism 
 
126. See MEVORACH, supra note 12, at 1–48, for a discussion of the evolution of modified 
universalism from the theory of pure universalism. 
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might make participants more reluctant to follow it. It might be that it is this 
humility and modesty attached to modified universalism that allowed it to 
grow through “incrementalism.”127 It may be conceived that rather than 
making explicit proclamations about the intentions of frameworks and 
pointing to concrete international laws, it is better to provide tools that 
achieve the same intentions without “scaring off” countries from 
participating in the regime.  
Yet if modified universalism is eventually transformed to CIL, it can 
benefit from the additional advantage that it can operate as a debiasing 
mechanism: namely, it can, at least to some extent, address countries’ 
aversions and reluctance to adhere to modified universalist instruments. 
Furthermore, by concealing the justificatory basis (the source) of certain 
solutions and focusing on technical results, there is a risk that both the 
frameworks’ design and the application of the rules they prescribe would be 
inconsistent. It is also more difficult to fill in gaps in the system in the absence 
of a general, settled norm. Finally, it was perhaps the case in the earlier stages 
of development of the cross-border insolvency system that some obscurity 
 
127. John A.E. Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework 
for Cross-Border Insolvency Choice of Law, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 197, 198 (2014) 
(suggesting, however, an independent normative theory for choice of law based on modified 
universalism); John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International 
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 939 (2005). 
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regarding its norms was merited so that frameworks could gain the initial 
traction and expand. Yet the cross-border insolvency system has gone 
through significant development, and the main cross-border insolvency 
instrument (the Model Law) has been adopted in a significant number of 
countries. It is now, therefore, time to stabilize the system further, including 
through greater clarity about its underlying norms and their legal status.  
Such separation and the use of CIL as a source for cross-border 
insolvency, while requiring that modified universalism is understood and 
used as a stand-alone norm, should not cause concern to proponents of 
incremental developments in this field. The use of CIL does not preclude 
developments. Because it is a source that is flexible and changeable, it can 
evolve over time, and it is possible to change or create new CIL to meet the 
developing needs of nations. 
V. Transformation: Modified Universalism Becoming CIL 
A. Evidence of a General Practice Accepted as Law 
Modified universalist approaches are already widespread in practice. 
Modified universalism seems to have generally guided the key existing 
frameworks for cross-border insolvency. These frameworks, in particular the 
Model Law, have been applied quite successfully by participating 
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countries.128 This practice is also not confined to a few specific jurisdictions, 
although it is undoubtedly more paramount in certain countries and regions. 
It is also not limited to specific entities, though a modified universalist 
practice is less established with regard to multinational enterprise groups and 
financial institutions.129 The usage of cross-border insolvency protocols and 
the increased cooperation between courts and between insolvency 
representatives in cross-border insolvencies are also demonstrations of a 
modified universalist practice.130 
 
128. See Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 517, 550 
(2011) (showing that the Model Law has been implemented and applied by countries in quite a 
universalist manner); see also Jay L. Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the 
United States of the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 268 (2013) 
(showing the success of the Model Law’s application in the United States). 
129. See, e.g., Mevorach, supra note 10, at 184 (noting that the Model Law does not specifically 
address international financial institutions); see also Barbara C. Matthews, Prospects for 
Coordination and Competition in Global Finance, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 289, 291–92 
(2010) (identifying some convergence of key rules pertaining to the resolution of banks that may 
amount to CIL but also noting the gap in the cross-border resolution system). 
130. It was already suggested in the Nineties that cross-border insolvency Concordats and 
cross-border insolvency agreements, which aim to create close cooperation and the centralization 
of the process in a lead forum, are likely to become evidence of an international customary norm. 
David H. Culmer, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It 
Ripe Yet?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 563, 564 (1999); see also Gaa, supra note 93, at 882 (asking whether 
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Yet for modified universalism to finally transform from an emerging to 
an established CIL, it is crucial that its application by relevant actors is 
generally pervasive and consistent. Hesitancy, contradiction, or fluctuation 
in invoking and applying the norm can undermine and ultimately negate the 
identification of CIL. Furthermore, the norm should be accepted as law. 
Thus, CIL might be disproved where it can be shown that participants who 
followed modified universalism were not motivated by a legal duty and acted 
in the belief that their acts amount to customary law. It has been argued, for 
example, regarding the concept of international comity, that “[a]t best, it is 
only incidental that some civil-law systems arrive at results comparable to 
the decisions of U.S. courts.”131 Regarding cross-border insolvency, it can be 
argued that because decisions or actions taken in this field are often either not 
explicitly based on modified universalism or are based on modified 
universalism as a broad approach linked to independent domestic common 
 
developments in the area should continue by way of the evolving international common law of 
bankruptcy or whether states should take the initiative to negotiate treaties identifying the applicable 
law). 
131. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 35 (1991). Comity may 
be described as “the deference of one nation to the legislative, executive, and judicial acts of 
another—not as an obligation, but as a courtesy serving international duty and convenience.” David 
Farmer, Chapter 15: Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, 18 HAW. BAR J., Oct. 2015, at 14, 
16. 
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law developments,132 its usage is in fact a demonstration of a tradition—but 
not of CIL. 
To establish modified universalism as autonomous CIL and make the 
identification of CIL more plausible, clear pronouncements are needed that 
can show a consistent acceptance of modified universalism and the 
application of the norm in accordance with international law. Of primary 
importance is how countries address cross-border insolvency, especially 
influential countries (including emerging cross-border insolvency “hubs”133) 
that are more often affected by the norm and have the chance to interact with 
other state-actors and shape the norm in the process. State-actors’ actions 
matter also when they proclaim intentions and act in international fora, 
including when deliberating on international instruments or other 
mechanisms in the form of hard or soft law, as such actions can demonstrate 
 
132. See, for example, the restrictive application of modified universalism by the U.K. Supreme 
Court in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [16], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(“[T]here has been a trend, but only a trend, to what is called universalism . . . .”), and the Court’s 
narrow interpretation in Hooley Ltd. v. Victoria Jute Co. [2016] CSOH 141 [36] (Scot.) (holding 
that the Scottish court would refuse to defer to India’s insolvency process). 
133. Notably, Singapore is “a key hub for cross-border restructuring and insolvency.” Kannan 
Ramesh, Jud. Comm’r, Sup. Ct. of Sing., Speech at the INSOL International Group of 36 Meeting: 
The Cross-Border Project – A “Dual-Track” Approach 10 (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/Data/Editor/Documents/In-sol%2036_Speech_khb_upload%20 
version.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZL4-KCT9]. 
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a crystallization of CIL. Existing international frameworks for cross-border 
insolvency have been somewhat obscure regarding the approach they are 
following,134 and thus there is room for clearer pronunciations in instruments 
of the universal application of modified universalism, intended for general 
adherence. 
How the key players of cross-border insolvency (bankruptcy courts and 
other implementing institutions, especially in countries most influential in 
this field) refer to and apply norms of modified universalism is also crucial 
and could matter beyond the creation of precedent within the jurisdiction, as 
it can influence and form CIL. Such actors when reaching decisions in line 
with modified universalism could proclaim the intention of following its 
prescribed solutions more explicitly and as a matter of obligation. Especially 
where provisions in instruments are insufficient to address all aspects of a 
given issue or where the country is not a party to an international framework, 
modified universalism norms become most relevant. In such cases, instead 
of, for example, solely relying on inherent discretionary powers in the legal 
 
134. For example, the preamble to the Model Law states that its purpose is to “provide effective 
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency,” but there is no specific reference to 
modified universalism, namely to a regime that aims to provide a global approach to multinational 
default, modified to fit business structures. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND 
INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014). 
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system to assist foreign courts, or grounding decisions on notions such as 
comity that are often vague and confined to specific countries,135 courts could 
explicitly refer to modified universalism as the guiding international law and, 
in the process, establish the acceptance of modified universalism as CIL. 
At various times, American courts have reached universalist decisions 
based primarily on the Model Law, but also on the principle of international 
comity enshrined in chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (the American 
version of the Model Law). In the case of In re Daebo,136 for example, the 
bankruptcy judge, referring also to In re Atlas Shipping A/S,137 noted that 
“Chapter 15 ‘contemplates that the court should be guided by principles of 
comity and cooperation with foreign courts in deciding whether to grant the 
foreign representative additional post-recognition relief.’”138 Relying on the 
comity principle, the court then granted certain relief to the foreign Korean 
 
135. See Kevin J. Beckering, United States Cross-Border Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of 
Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal Environment, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 281, 281 (2008) 
(describing comity as an “impediment” to attaining unification in the area of cross-border 
insolvency); John J. Chung, In re Qimonda AG: The Conflict Between Comity and the Public Policy 
Exception in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 89, 96, 104 (2014) (describing 
comity as an “amorphous concept” that courts have struggled to define). 
136. In re Daebo Int’l Shipping Co., 543 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
137. 404 B.R. 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
138. In re Daebo, 543 B.R. at 53 (quoting In re Atlas, 404 B.R. at 738). Chapter 15 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code refers to the principle of comity in §§ 1507(b) and 1509. 
MEVORACH.COTTONEDITSMEVORACH.PROOFREAD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/20185/22/2018  8:05 AM11:31 AM 
201x] Mevorach.CottonEditsMevorach.Proofread 151 
rehabilitation proceedings and vacated attachments pursuant to the Korean 
stay of actions concerning the company’s assets. This decision was in line 
with modified universalism norms regarding recognition, cooperation, and 
relief, yet modified universalism was not mentioned explicitly as the 
applicable norm. 
In future cases of this kind, judges could, in addition to applying 
domestic concepts of international comity, and especially where technical 
statutory rules require reinforcement or a separate justificatory force, refer 
explicitly to modified universalist norms that require uniform adherence, thus 
contributing to the transformation of them into CIL. The fact that powerful 
nations such as the US have adopted international instruments, especially the 
Model Law, should not be a factor working against modified universalism 
becoming CIL; rather, this development should be a catalyst for making the 
norms that such instruments pursue more widespread. The inclination could 
be to just rely on provisions of instruments as adopted locally and refrain 
from considering norms beyond the instruments,139 thus impeding the use of 
modified universalism as an international norm. Yet by appreciating the role 
of key actors as creators of international law and the potential of modified 
universalism to become universal, international law that transcends local 
 
139. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit, 374 B.R. 122, 132 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that there is no residual common law 
discretion under chapter 15). 
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differences can help overcome such tendencies. 
Decisions of international tribunals could contribute to entrenching 
modified universalism as CIL as well, if they pronounce modified 
universalism norms more explicitly. In a case that reached the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), MG Probud Gdynia,140 for example, 
it was not clear whether the German authorities could order enforcement 
measures regarding assets of the company situated in Germany (where a 
Polish company had a branch), in circumstances where the main proceedings 
were taking place in Poland.141 The CJEU concluded that the German 
authorities erred in their attempt to impose such local enforcement 
measures.142 The court noted the universality of the main Polish proceedings 
based on the provisions of the EIR.143 It further stated, also citing 
Eurofood,144 that pursuant to the EIR provisions and recitals, proceedings 
opened in a member state must be recognized and be given effect in all other 
member states.145 This rule, the court explained, “is based on the principle of 
 
140. Case C-444/07, 2010 E.C.R. I-0417. 
141.  Id. at ¶¶ 16–20. 
142.  Id. at ¶ 44. 
143.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
144. Case C-341/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-3813. 
145.  Case C-444/07, MG Probud Gdynia, 2010 E.C.R. I-0417, ¶ 27 (citing Case C-341/04, 
Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813). 
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mutual trust.”146 Mutual trust is certainly a core notion that facilitated the 
establishment of the compulsory cross-border insolvency system within the 
EU.147 The premise of mutual trust in the administration of justice in the EU 
requires giving full faith and credit to courts of other member states.148 Like 
comity, however, mutual trust is a vague concept,149 and its justificatory force 
is limited.150 It is also confined in the EIR context to relationships between 
states within the region.151 Conversely, a reference to modified universalism 
could both provide concrete justification for the decision to require that full 
effect be given to the foreign main proceedings and contribute to the 
 
146.   Id. 
147. Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 26 (EU) (“The recognition of judgments delivered 
by the courts of the Member States should be based on the principle of mutual trust.”); Case C-
444/07, MG Probud Gdynia, 2010 E.C.R. I-0417, ¶ 28; Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 
E.C.R. I-3813, ¶ 39. 
148. See also Matthias Weller, Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Union 
Private International Law, 11 J. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 64, 68 (2015) (referring to mutual trust as a 
“rather opaque, yet almost omnipresent buzzword . . .”). 
149.  WESSELS, supra note 89, at 46. 
150. Weller, supra note 148, at 101 (“The justificatory force of mutual trust is limited. Using 
mutual trust as legal fiction does not work, at least not beyond the point reached in the system.”). 
151. See Christoph G. Paulus, The ECJ’s Understanding of the Universality Principle, 27 
INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 70, 71 (2014) (“[T]he European legislator’s power to regulate issues 
of insolvency is confined to membership relationships within the EU . . . .”). 
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transformation of modified universalism to CIL. 
The transformation of modified universalism to CIL may not take too 
long in view of the already existing widespread practice in this direction and 
the extensive traction that norms of modified universalism have gained in 
recent years. What is required is not taking a big leap to pure universalism 
but settling on the norms of modified universalism. Certainly, to develop the 
norms into CIL requires that countries and implementing institutions have 
opportunities to interact. Yet cross-border insolvency cases are not a rare 
phenomenon. Changes in political powers and shifts of economic centers also 
mean that country interaction is likely to spread more, creating a critical mass 
and concentration of activity conducive to CIL. It is important to note, 
however, the evolutionary nature of CIL and hence the fact that the work on 
its transformation and further development is a process: “The customary 
process is in fact a continuous one, which does not stop when the rule has 
emerged . . . . Even after the rule has ‘emerged,’ every act of compliance will 
strengthen it, and every violation, if acquiesced in, will help to undermine 
it.”152 Furthermore, the notion of elevating modified universalism to the 
status of CIL should not be understood as a replacement of international 
 
152. Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 RECUEIL 
DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 175 
(1998). 
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negotiations and deliberations that attempt to improve the written 
instruments.153 To the contrary, creating and guarding modified universalism 
as an international custom should facilitate such negotiations because of the 
behavioral force of CIL and its ability to shift the reference point of actors 
regarding universalism. Vice versa, the development of regional and 
international frameworks can further define and develop the CIL rules. 
B. Use of CIL in Future Cross-Border Insolvencies 
Modified universalism established as CIL can promote a wider coverage 
and a more consistent application of the norms. As noted above, there are still 
important gaps in the cross-border insolvency system, including participation 
in the main international framework for cross-border insolvency (the Model 
Law) and the entities and issues covered by international instruments.154 
Modified universalism, standing on its own two feet, emerging as CIL, can 
assist in closing such gaps in the complex international system.155 The 
 
153. For example, see the ongoing deliberations of UNCITRAL Working Group V on the 
design of model laws on recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and on the 
cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. 
of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/931 (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission 
/working_groups/5Insolvency.html [https://perma.cc/B43H-K2VZ]. 
154. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
155. Cf. Guzman, supra note 17, at 119 n.17 (explaining that, even though bilateral treaties 
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pervasiveness of CIL as an international legal source is an important 
advantage where modified universalism requires universality and full 
coverage of the market (market symmetry156). Once CIL has become 
prevalent, countries are bound by it regardless of whether they have codified 
the laws domestically or through treaties unless they have actively objected 
to it. Thus, while more action through the recognition of the international role 
of cross-border insolvency is important, it is enough that modified 
universalism is practiced generally and especially by influential economies 
and transnational actors. Countries (and their implementing institutions) that 
are more averse to change will still become party to a system based on 
modified universalism. 
 In practical terms, this means, for example, that in future cases 
involving countries that have not (1) taken action to adopt the Model Law, 
(2) ensured that the Model Law, where enacted, actually becomes effective 
in the jurisdiction, (3) become a party to any other international instrument 
that follow modified universalism, or (4) enacted rules that otherwise 
 
dominate the foreign investments legal regime, many investments are not covered by these treaties, 
yet the legal rules included in the treaties seem to have become CIL and, therefore, are generally 
more universally binding). 
156. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 2283 (explaining the importance of market symmetry—
the idea that bankruptcy systems in a legal regime cover all transactions and stakeholders within 
that market—to cross-border insolvency). 
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facilitate global collective insolvencies, such countries  will still be expected 
to follow modified universalism. It will also be possible to rely on uniform 
norms of cross-border insolvency rather than invoke domestic mechanisms 
when, for example, recognition, relief, or assistance is sought in a foreign 
jurisdiction. Such norms may be invoked by foreign actors157 in the court or 
other body presiding over the process. If the norms are rejected by the 
relevant institution, the rejection may be regarded as a breach of international 
law. Provisions in international instruments, too, would apply to countries 
not party to the framework to the extent that the framework reflects the rules 
of CIL. Thus, even where a framework does not bind certain countries, its 
provisions may form part of the global legal order of insolvency. 
The use of CIL can overcome outdated notions of comity and reciprocity 
and equalize the treatment of foreign proceedings and the approach to foreign 
requests—for example, in a country such as South Africa, which has adopted 
the Model Law but has not given effect to its provisions.158 CIL can also assist 
 
157. Foreign actors may be state as well as non-state actors. Indeed, both may be subject to the 
rights and obligations of international law as the scope of international law has been expanded. 
Specifically, CIL is increasingly invoked by non-state actors. For a discussion of the increasing role 
of non-state actors in the realm of international law, see Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International 
Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 112–25 (2012). 
158. South Africa included a reciprocity condition requiring it to designate relevant countries 
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when taking actions in cross-border insolvencies in countries such as China, 
which has not adopted the Model Law. Recognition and enforcement in 
China of foreign insolvency proceedings are conditioned on the existence of 
a relevant international treaty, in addition to other requirements such as that 
the insolvency proceeding shall not jeopardize the sovereignty and security 
of the state or public interests.159 This specific domestic cross-border 
insolvency regime that was introduced in China in 2006 was still an obstacle 
to the smooth administration of cross-border insolvencies. For example, in 
litigation in the context of the cross-border insolvency of Lehman Brothers, 
a Chinese court considered that proceedings opened in the UK should not be 
given effect in China (with regard to property situated in China) because of 
a lack of reciprocity, as China did not have a relevant arrangement with the 
UK.160 Going forward, where modified universalism is applied as CIL, 
 
that could invoke the Model Law’s provisions, yet such designation never took place. Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 § 2 (S. Afr.); see also RH Zulman, Cross-Border Insolvency in South 
African Law, 21 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 804, 816–17 (2009) (noting that comity and reciprocity 
enshrined in the South African version of the Model Law are outmoded and not in conformity with 
modern thinking on the subject). 
159. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo qi ye po chan fa (中华人民共和国企业破产法) 
[Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), art. 5. 
160. Xinyi Gong, To Recognise or Not To Recognise? Comparative Study of Lehman Brothers 
Cases in Mainland China and Taiwan, 10 INT’L CORP. RESCUE 240, 241 (2013). The court reached 
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foreign insolvency representatives should be able to invoke it and attempt 
recognition and enforcement to promote a collective global approach in the 
foreign main forum, including in such circumstances where the relevant 
country is not a party to uniform frameworks and so long as it is not a 
persistent objector to the CIL regime. 
As aforementioned, CIL also plays a role regulating within the gaps of 
treaties or other instruments. For example, based on modified universalism’s 
norm of cooperation, courts and other authorities would have the authority 
and the duty to cooperate and communicate, including where the debtor is an 
entity that is not explicitly covered under existing instruments. The case of 
Lehman Brothers161 is illustrative. In this case, cooperation was achieved 
because of the participants’ initiative and voluntary will, yet this cooperation 
was constrained.162 The enterprise type and structure (i.e., the fact that 
 
this conclusion even though the UK has adopted the Model Law and therefore would be required to 
recognize foreign insolvencies pursuant to the terms of the instrument. See id. at 242 (asserting that 
Article 5 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law grants outbound universal effect to insolvency 
proceedings initiated in China and that this might be recognized in the UK pursuant to the Model 
Law, which does not condition recognition by reciprocity). 
161. In re Lehman Bros. Int’l (Eur.) [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2022, [2011] All ER 273 (Eng.). 
162. See Paul L. Davies, Resolution of Cross-Border Groups, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE BANKING SECTOR 261, 263–64 (Matthias Haentjens & Bob Wessels 
eds., 2015) (discussing how both the U.S. and the U.K. took unilateral action in the bailouts of non-
national entities, including Lehman Brothers, in order to protect national interests); James M. Peck, 
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Lehman Brothers was a multinational financial institution/enterprise group) 
resulted in aspects of the case falling outside the scope of existing 
instruments.163 Where modified universalism is recognized as CIL, 
cooperation would become a universal legal requirement, including for the 
purpose of reaching efficient centralized solutions for more complicated 
enterprise structures.164 
As modified universalism established as CIL is flexible enough to 
accommodate changing conditions, it can also be invoked regarding newer 
types of processes and procedures that may not be covered in written 
instruments. The shift in the focus of insolvency procedures from formal 
liquidations to rescue-oriented and various informal processes, including in 
 
Cross-Border Observations Derived from My Lehman Judicial Experience, 30 BUTTERWORTHS J. 
INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 131, 132 (2015) (explaining that cross-border conflicts and self-interested 
behaviours in the context of the Lehman insolvencies were unavoidable). 
163. Mevorach, supra note 10, at 191 (explaining that the general cross-border Model Law for 
insolvency lacked sufficient measures to address the Lehman insolvency and that no specific cross-
border framework exists for international financial institutions). 
164. Since the fall of Lehman Brothers, UNCITRAL has been developing model provisions 
concerning enterprise groups (deliberations were ongoing at the time this article went to print). U.N. 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Facilitating the Cross-Border 
Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups: Draft Legislative Provisions, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG/V/WP.158 (Feb. 26, 2018). Thus, going forward, CIL may address gaps in the new 
regime including in terms of its universal application pending wide enactment by countries. 
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the time approaching insolvency where there is likelihood of insolvency or 
financial difficulties, is an example of such changes in the practice of 
insolvency that instruments may be slow to capture.165 However, modified 
universalism norms can be invoked regarding interim, out-of-court, or pre-
insolvency procedures even where they are not covered within the scope of 
cross-border domestic laws or international instruments. An example of such 
an approach is the decision of the Singapore court in the Gulf Pacific 
Shipping case.166 In this case, the court, based on “internationalist concerns,” 
decided to recognize the appointment of liquidators over Hong Kong 
shipping company Gulf Pacific and grant the requested assistance, despite 
the debtor being in out-of-court proceedings regarding which the domestic 
powers of assistance were constrained.167 
Furthermore, to the extent that CIL does not contradict special treaty 
law, it can override conflicting laws in civil law countries and will be 
considered part and parcel of the public policy in common law jurisdictions 
 
165. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of 
Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, at 28, 
COM (2016) 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016) (attempting to harmonize aspects related to preventive 
restructuring proceedings in EU member states). 
166. [2016] SGHC 287 at [6] [(HC, S’pore)] (unreported) (recognizing the foreign proceedings 
and allowing the liquidators to obtain information regarding a closed bank account of the company). 
167.  Id. at [10]. 
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where legislation is to be construed in a manner that would avoid a conflict 
with the international norm. Thus, modified universalism understood as CIL 
can provide the separate, sui generis basis and justification for the uniform 
private international laws based on global collectivity. Any ordinary 
domestic private international laws could sit alongside the cross-border 
insolvency CIL regime rather than be considered in conflict with it in the 
given circumstances. Thus, in future cases with circumstances of the type 
arising, for example, in Rubin—where the existing cross-border insolvency 
instrument might not provide a clear answer (in that case, regarding the 
question of enforcement of insolvency-related judgments of the main 
insolvency forum)168—the foreign insolvency representative would be able 
to rely on modified universalism as an international norm.169 Such an 
 
168. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [91], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
169. Since Rubin, UNCITRAL has been developing a model law on the enforcement of 
insolvency-related judgments (deliberations were ongoing at the time this Article went to print). 
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Work of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on its 
Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/931, Annex, Draft Model Law on Cross-Border 
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments at 16 (Jan. 15, 2018); U.N. 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and Enforcement 
of Insolvency-Related Judgments: Draft Model Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG/V/WP.156 (Feb. 19, 
2018). Thus, going forward, CIL may assist in closing gaps in the new regime, including in terms 
of its universal application pending wide enactment by countries. 
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outcome was unattainable in the Rubin case, and the request to enforce the 
judgment of the central foreign court was denied because modified 
universalism was applied as a general principle of common law subject to the 
domestic private international law regime.170 In other circumstances, courts 
may be asked, for example, to give full effect to a foreign stay on actions 
concerning the assets of the enterprise, instead of (as happened in Pan 
Ocean171) apply domestic ipso facto rules that allow them to terminate 
contracts, thus undermining the collectivity of the cross-border insolvency 
process.172 Similarly, courts could be asked to recognize transactions already 
approved by foreign main reorganization proceedings, instead of (as 
happened, e.g., in Elpida173) applying the domestic rules concerning asset 
sales.174 The application of the domestic rule can undeniably delay the 
process, as well as provide local creditors an unjustified chance to challenge 
the sale, undermining the norm of a global, nondiscriminatory approach 
prescribed by modified universalism. 
 
170.  Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [177], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
171. Pan Ocean Co. v. Fibria Celulose S/A [2014] EWHC (Civ) 2124, [2014] All ER 03 (Eng.). 
172.  Id. 
173. In re Elpida Memory, Inc., No. 12-10947, 2012 WL 6090194 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16, 
2012). 
174.  Id. at *8–9. 
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Modified universalism based on CIL could also serve to influence 
international instruments. It could reinforce technical rules where the 
instrument refers to the rules of CIL. Currently, requirements in cross-border 
insolvency frameworks, for example, cooperation “to the maximum extent 
possible,”175 could be understood in different ways. They could be interpreted 
in a universalist manner, suggesting obligatory cooperation to achieve 
universality within the parameters of modified universalism. Yet they could 
also be understood as suggesting cooperative territorialism, namely self-
serving cooperation, that promotes local interests in the case at hand while 
still allowing, for example, ring-fencing of assets if that appears to be in the 
interests of national stakeholders. The lack of clear statements concerning the 
level of universalism that should be followed also renders proclamations of 
objectives—such as effectiveness, efficiency, or fairness, stated as the aims 
of cross-border insolvency systems176—open to interpretation and variation 
 
175. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION 13, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 
(2014). 
176. Id. at 3. The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency promotes several objectives: 
Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this State and 
foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; [g]reater legal certainty 
for trade and investment; [f]air and efficient administration of cross-border 
insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, 
including the debtor; [p]rotection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s 
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in the cross-border context. Thus, fairness and efficiency may be viewed 
from a vested-rights, territorial perspective or from a global, universalist 
perspective. Going forward, CIL can be used to ensure a consistent 
application of objectives and requirements enshrined in frameworks in line 
with modified universalism. Modified universalism based on CIL can also 
provide specific substance to requirements to interpret instruments by having 
regard to their “international origin.”177 
Conclusion 
Lessons from international law, as well as insights from cognitive 
psychology of decision-making, highlight the advantages that can be gained 
from modified universalism conceptualized and formed as CIL. Modified 
universalism recognized as CIL could fill gaps and promote consistency in 
the application of regional and international frameworks. Furthermore, a 
modified universalist CIL can assist in the areas where biases impede 
 
assets; and [f]acilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby 
protecting investment and preserving employment. 
Id. 
177. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“[R]egard is to be had to [this law’s] international origin and to the need 
to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.”); see also Jay L. 
Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 750–51 (2015) (arguing that 
“system” texts that establish an international framework require an international rather than an 
insular interpretation). 
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movement to more optimal solutions. If the rules of modified universalism 
are generally conceived as CIL, modified universalism will be the default 
universal rule, embraced as an opt-out regime, and adherence to it would not 
require positive action from all participants. Such use of legislative framing 
can affect the consequences of inaction and can result in higher participation, 
with greater universality and integrity, in the application of modified 
universalism. In this respect, it is important that the role of cross-border 
insolvency is reinforced. Indeed, as a private international law system, it has 
international objectives to pursue. Private international law generally is 
increasingly being reunited with the international law system, and its role is 
augmenting. The international nature of cross-border insolvency and the fact 
that insolvency addresses both private and public interests further justify the 
solidification of its international role. Thus, cross-border insolvency law 
should engage in international norm creation and, in that regard, could rely 
on modified universalism where it provides concrete and practical rules that 
can be followed consistently. Key actors, importantly courts and other 
authorities presiding over cross-border insolvency cases—as well as 
regulators, policy makers, and international organizations engaged in 
international insolvency law making—should be less context-dependent and 
should perceive their roles more broadly, considering public international law 
sources and mechanisms for creating and enhancing international 
obligations. 
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